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financial markets, and economic growth. We explore two key questions: (i) 
How financial markets interact with innovation; (ii) what type of quality 
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further developed in the articles collected in this issue.
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1 Introduction
This paper discusses the literature at the intersection of innovation, financial 
mar-kets, and economic growth. There are two interrelated objectives: one is to 
connect more explicitly the themes that are investigated in the papers collected in 
this issue1 and point out gaps that could be further developed, while a second 
objective, in the
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2traditional spirit of the Journal of Evolutionary Economics, is to promote the inter-
action between different streams of economic literature. Hence we have selected
contributions that have tackled similar questions but with different methodologies.
We connect the themes by focusing on two key questions: (i) how financial mar-
kets interact with innovation, and (ii) what type of transformations are brought about
by innovation. The first question was already posed by the young Schumpeter who
considered money, credit and finance as essential to the innovation process: “credit
is essentially to the creation of purchasing power for the purpose of transferring it to
the entrepreneur” (Schumpeter 1912, 107). The second question originates from the
observation that bursts of technological progress can lead to higher inequality and
that this could increase the risk of financial crisis.
As for the methodological objective, we connect the papers collected in this issue
through a Schumpeterian approach, whenever this is applicable. When studying the
functioning of the financial markets, a subject rather neglected by the Schumpeterian
literature, we discuss the search literature, which, we will argue, presents interesting
similarities with the papers collected here.
Inspired by Russo et al. (2016), we begin by discussing why credit can have a
destabilizing effect on the economy. We focus especially on the role of inequal-
ity. In a pioneering work, Benabou (1996) conjectured that a country with a more
unequal distribution of wealth and an underdeveloped financial system could exhibit
poorer macroeconomic performance. We note a substantial shift in the literature
after the 2008 crisis. For instance, we will look at household debt as a key chan-
nel through which income and wealth inequality can trigger a big crisis, as observed
in 2008.
Section 2, taking the lead from Jacob Leal et al. (2016), elaborates on how the
design of trading algorithms can spur a financial crisis. It then discusses more in
detail the choices of market makers and investors in an over-the-counter model
following the now popular approach of Duffie et al. (2005).
Section 3 links the working of financial markets with corporate governance.
Gaffeo and Massimo (2016) study the implications of a shock that hits a node of
the interbank network system under alternative regulations on mergers and acqui-
sitions (M&A). Mergers are one way of bringing managerial discipline within the
firm, which many believe is a good way of promoting investments in innovation.
The section is mostly devoted to exploring further this statement. In a classic work,
Manne (1965) identified three ways in which the market for corporate control can
solve managerial abuses or inefficiencies: proxy fights, friendly mergers, and hostile
takeovers. We then integrate issues of managerial disciplines within a Schumpeterian
model, following closely Iacopetta et al. (2014). In this section, we also discuss the
difficulties of following the propagation mechanism of a shock, such as the one pre-
sented by Gaffeo and Massimo (2016), when firms are different in size and there are
strong asymmetries in the configuration of the network that links them.
The survey then approaches the issue of distortions and externalities that arise
from the fact that knowledge is a public good. Section 4 briefly presents Babutsidze’s
(2016) approach to innovation that abstracts from the public good part of the gen-
eral knowledge and concentrates on its cumulativeness at the firm level. We then
use Gray and Grimaud (2016) as a starting point for discussing more broadly the
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market price for innovation is far from one that would generate an efficient out-
come. Gray and Grimaud approached the question from a theory point of view in a
monopolistic competition model. In such an environment, typically the incentive to
generate innovation is based on the flow of profits the innovation generates. Nev-
ertheless, the overall value for the society of the innovation can be much larger.
In Section 4 there are two related aspects we consider, the sequentially of the
innovation process (Marengo and Zeppini 2016) and, starting from the insights of
Sanditov and Saurabh (2016), the interaction between human capital and technolog-
ical change.
In the last section, we broaden the time horizon and consider radical transfor-
mations associated with the arrival of new technologies. In Lorentz et al. (2016),
changes in the pattern of consumption drive structural change in production and labor
productivity. The mechanisms they investigate in fact build on two large strands of
literature. One studies the role of non-homothetic preferences in generating trans-
formation in the composition of production. The other investigates the process of
technological change that occurs with the dissemination of new technologies. We
will focus mostly on this second stream of literature, although at the end we close the
circle by reviewing the classic work of Matsuyama (2002). This, in the same spirit
of Lorentz et al., proposes a story in which growth – fueled by the arrival of new
industries and by learning by doing – is triggered by transformations in consumption
patterns.
2 Financial markets, growth, and inequality
Building on two earlier works (Riccetti et al. 2014; Russo et al. 2014), Russo et al.
(2016) present a simulation based analysis that shows that consumer credit can have
a destabilizing effect on the economy. In the presence of consumer credit, on aver-
age there are more crises, more aggregate volatility, higher unemployment and also
more inequality. Their work adds to a body of literature that challenges the classic
dichotomy between fairness and efficiency. The link between consumption demand
and income distribution is done by assuming that the propensity to save is related to
individual’s wealth and that consumers may borrow to compensate for a temporary
decline in income or wealth.
Despite the fact that the role of inequality in the relationship between finance and
growth represents a relatively recent line of research, in a pioneering work, Benabou
(1996) conjectured that a country with a more unequal distribution of wealth and an
underdeveloped financial system could exhibit poorer macroeconomic performance.
The idea is that when financial markets are inefficient, the returns across investment
projects are not equalized. The greater the level of inequality, the larger the return
differentials, and the bigger the loss in potential aggregate output. In this perspective,
greater financial development is expected to reduce inequality by eliminating finan-
cial imperfections (such as information and transactions costs). This can especially
benefit the poor who lack collateral and credit histories, thus relaxing their credit
constraints and promoting the growth of their income.
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few economists have highlighted the potentially adverse aggregate demand effects
of rising inequality and pointed to the macroeconomic risks associated with exces-
sive household debt and caused by income inequality. At that time, however, most
economists either ignored the macroeconomic implications of inequality or explic-
itly welcomed the increasing availability of personal credit as an efficient market
response to a higher demand by households for insurance against a higher dispersion
of the transitory component of income.
The mechanisms through which financial development can enhance growth and
reduce inequality have been studied theoretically by Galor and Zeira (1993), and then
further examined by Aghion and Bolton (1997). But the theoretical production has
been lacking until recently. An impetus arrived rather from the more empirical liter-
ature. During the 1990s and until 2003, consumption inequality remained essentially
flat, according to the data used by Krueger and Perri (2006).
Following Katz and Autor (1999), they regressed income and consumption on a
number of characteristics (years of education, experience, interaction terms between
experience and education, race, sex, and dummies for managerial/professional occu-
pation, and region of residence). These characteristics explain about 25 % of the
cross-sectional variation of income and consumption in 1980. Krueger and Perri
(2006) denoted the cross-sectional variance explained by these characteristics as
“between-group” inequality and the residual variance as “within-group” inequality.
Based on these definitions, they found that, for consumption, the between-group
component displayed an increase similar in magnitude to that of income. But for the
within-group component, the increase in consumption inequality (around 3 %) was
much smaller than the increase in income inequality (around 16 %). They concluded
that within-group inequality was mainly transitory or somehow insurable, whereas
changes in between-group inequality reflected permanent, or uninsurable, changes in
distribution.
Other authors, by contrast, have analyzed the link between rising levels of income
inequality and household debt and macroeconomic instability from a more explicitly
Keynesian perspective (e.g. Palley 1994; Dutt 2006; Stockhammer 2012). In recent
years there has been a proliferation of books supporting the view that inequality
was a root cause of the 2008 financial crisis (Rajan 2010; Reich 2010; Galbraith
2012; Stiglitz 2012). But there is also a nascent body of more formal academic liter-
ature that has critically assessed the link between inequality and crisis theoretically
and empirically (e.g. Atkinson and Morelli 2010, 2011; Kumhof and Ranciere 2010;
Kumhof et al. 2012; Lucchino and Morelli 2012; Bordo and Meissner 2012). For
example, Beck et al. (2007) demonstrated that the development of financial interme-
diaries and the improvement of their quality reduces income inequality. Moreover, by
expanding the opportunities of access to credit, a more developed financial system
can also improve the efficiency of capital allocation, increase agents’ productivity
and free resources for welfare.
However, this is not the only possible link between inequality and financial devel-
opment. The latter, in fact, could result in higher income inequality if the rich (who
already have access to credit) benefit more than proportionally from the expansion
of credit opportunities. According to this second viewpoint, the poor tend to rely
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in the formal financial sector do not affect their ability to implement investment
opportunities. Indeed, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) put forth the idea of a pos-
sible nonlinear relationship between financial development, income inequality, and
economic development.
Claessens and Perotti (2007) have reviewed the cross-country evidence on these
issues, and argue that, in countries with historically high inequality, financial devel-
opment distorts the institutional environment by favoring the financial sector. In turn,
the financial sector is able to appropriate all the benefits of the greater access to
financial services and also prevent financial reforms that could promote a more equal
distribution of income and wealth. The higher initial inequality produces unequal
access to finance, and then leads to unequal opportunities, which in turn reinforces
the initial economic inequality. In such a scenario, institutional and political factors,
such as political accountability, are critical for the success of financial reforms that
redistribute the gains from financial development.
Now we turn to the attempt made by Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) and Kumhof
et al. (2015) to explain the potential role played by income and wealth inequality in
triggering the 1929 and the 2008 recessions. One important fact they document is
the evolution of the debt-to-income ratio at the top and the bottom of the income and
wealth distributions in the pre-crisis years 1983–2007. If in 1983 the top wealth group
was more indebted than the bottom group, in 2007 it was the reverse: the debt-to-
income ratio was twice as high in the bottom group than the top group (in the bottom
group it was 140 %). How does such a dynamic in the debt-to-income ratio translate
into a dramatic drop in production? Kumhof et al. (2015) provided an explanation in
a model with two types of agents. On the one side there are “investors” who use their
savings either to increase their stock of physical capital or to make loans. On the other
side there are “workers” who can borrow loans from investors. Population is normal-
ized to 1. A fraction χ are investors and the remaining fraction 1 − χ are workers.
Aggregate production is represented by a standard Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion: yt = A
(
χkt kt−1
)α
(1 − χ)1−α where A is a scalar and kt captures the arrival
of a negative shock. In normal times kt = 1, whereas in bad times kt = γ kt < 1.
Physical capital is accumulated according to kt = (1−δ)kt kt−1+It . The budget con-
straint of the investor is cit = rtkt kt−1 +lt dt−1 − qtdt − It where dt is the price of
a bond that gives one in the following period (t +1). There could be different reasons
of why households want to allocate funds both on capital accumulation and loans.
Kumhof and Ranciere (2010) simply assumed that both types of wealth enter into the
utility function. Turning attention now the ‘workers’ side, their budget constraint is
cwt = wt+lt qt−lt lt−1 where lt stands for loan and wt is the wage at time t . The term
lt is meant to capture a bad shock. It is equal to 1 in good times a to γ
l
t < 1 in times
of crisis. A crucial assumption, partly based on the work of Schneider and Tornell
(2000), is that the workers’ default probability, πt , is increasing according to a logis-
tic function on the debt-to-income ratio, that is, on the ratio lt
wt−st where st accounts
for the interest payment on the outstanding loans (i.e. st = 1/qt − 1). This is how
the mechanism works. Imagine that the level of income of investors increases while
that of the workers declines. Consumption smoothing implies that workers will try
to borrow more in order to prevent a drop in consumption (the preferences are such
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a certain probability πt , which is increasing in the workers’ debt-to-income ratio. In
a calibration exercise they estimate that the crisis probability is 5 % at a leverage of
150 %, which is about the size recorded in 2007 for the bottom wealth group. The
collapse of output is taken to be 10 % with a probability of 10 %, implying an out-
put collapse of 2.7 %, a bit short of what is found in the data after the crisis, that
is, between 3 and 4 %. In short, a higher debt leverage is the unintended result of
good luck on the side of investors (high income individuals) who have a preference
for keeping wealth and making loans to the workers. This increase in credit supply
allows workers (low and middle-income households) to sustain higher consumption
levels. As loans accumulate, however, so does, the probability of a crisis (πt ) which
would lead to a contraction in the real economy. An obvious limit of this framework
is the absence of a measure of involuntary employment. Here the only way to have
a reduction in output is to invoke some sudden decline the use of the existing stock
of capital. Therefore, the baseline shock of 10 % may be an overestimate of what it
takes to account for a 2.7 % decline in output.
3 Market makers
With the advent of information technologies, the speed of trade accelerated dramati-
cally. If at the end of WWII the average US share was held by an investor for a length
of about four years, that window fell to around eight months by the year 2000 and to
only two months in 2008 (Haldane 2011). Perhaps a more startling way of looking
at the accelerated speed of transactions is the time it takes to a trading platform to
execute an order. Here the scale is fractions of a second. Ironically, the age of high
speed has made geographical location more relevant, because the time needed to exe-
cute an order depends on the proximity to a major trading platform. The squeezing of
execution time and the more intensive use of complex algorithms is believed to have
had an important role in Flash Crashes, such as the one occurred on May 6th 2010.
In this crash, it has been estimated that as much as $1 trillion in equity market value
evaporated in half-an-hour. How such crashes can occur is strongly debated in the lit-
erature. Jacob Leal et al. (2016) offers an interesting insight into the phenomenon by
focusing on the asymmetry between high and low frequency traders.
Regulators and governments are constantly under pressure to limit the possible
damages of high frequency trade without taking away its potential benefits. Their
numerical elaborations show that the more sophisticated traders (high-frequency
traders) tend to fuel the volatility of the market because their activities increase the
bid-ask spread and because they tend to synchronize sales on the limit order book.
There is a growing interest in monetary institutions in evaluating alternative
methodological approaches that can explain sudden reactions of the financial mar-
kets to shocks. Because standard macroeconomic models assume that exchanges are
made in perfectly working centralized markets, they are not well suited in assess-
ing the role of the frequency of trade or of individuals’ heterogeneity in a financial
crisis. The search tradition, however, is closer to the agent-based approach fol-
lowed by Jacob Leal et al. (2016), as it put at the center stage of the analysis the
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the two approaches, we have chosen an over-the-counter trading model that explains
how the bid-ask spread of market-makers is related to the frequency of meetings. The
discussion is based on Duffie et al. (2005) who presented a variant of the coconuts
model of Diamond (1982) and of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989).
There are two types of agents: Investors (I) and market-makers (M). Investors
can produce a divisible good (service good) and can hold at most one unit of an
indivisible asset. An investor has a high (rh) or low (rl) evaluation of an asset. In
Jacob Leal et al., the main difference across investors is the preference about the
frequency of trade. Nevertheless, as it will be clarified, differences across agents in
the evaluation of an asset have implications for its trade frequency. The evaluation
state j = {l, h} is governed by a Poisson process of parameter ωj . Market-makers
buy assets from investors and off-load their assets in a frictionless interdealer market.
Therefore, they never hold assets. We look first at the gains from trade when two
investors meet. A necessary condition for them to trade is that one has the asset and
the other does not. Furthermore it must be that the investor that holds the asset is in
state j = l (gives a low evaluation) whereas the other investor is in state j = h (it
gives a high evaluation). In all other circumstances, the two investors part ways and
wait for next match. The main interest here is to understand under what conditions
trade between two investors occurs. Let Vi,j be the investor’s value function when he
holds i assets, where i = {0, 1} in state j . Clearly, when an investor sells his asset
he gets a gain pI − l where pI is the selling price and l = V1,l − V0,l . Similarly,
the investor on the other side of the trade gains h − pI , where h = V1,h − V0,h,
and the total surplus of the bilateral trade is SI = h − l . A share of this surplus
θ1 goes to the seller (the agent that enters the trade with one unit of an asset) and
the remaining fraction θ0 = 1 − θ1 goes to the buyer. Hence, θ1SI = pI − l , and
θ0SI = h − pI . This accounts for the gains from the I ’s perspective. What is the
outcome of a meeting between I and M? Obviously, a trade between the two occurs
only when I enters with an asset in a state j = l (wishes to sell) or I enters with no
assets in a state j = h (wishes to buy). If I gets the asset pays to M an ask price pA.
In the reverse situation, the investor I receives a bid price pB and gives away one unit
of the asset. When M uploads an asset on the interdealer market the bilateral gain is
pM − l , where pM is the interdealer market price. Similarly, if the market-maker
buys on behalf of the investor an asset on the interdealer market, the total bilateral
gain is h − pM .
Finally we can turn to the computation of the spread pA − pB , that is, the gain of
the market-maker on the two-leg operation. Let θM be the share of the bilateral sur-
plus captured by M . Then this agent earns θM(h−pM) = pA−pM in one leg of the
trade and θM(pM −l) = pM −pB on the other leg. Summing by parts the last two
equations, we obtain the spread: pA − pB = θM(h − l) > 0. It is now clear, that
to understand the forces behind the spread, one needs to disentangle the mechanisms
that affect h and l , the change in the value function of the high- and low-investor,
respectively, triggered by the acquisition of an asset. The trading decisions are easy
to describe. The purchase (sale) on the interdealer market will be done by M as long
as the bilateral surplus is non-negative, that is, h ≥ pM (l ≤ pM ). But what is not
easy is to determine the value of h and l , as these are affected by the investors’
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rationality approach of agent based models devises rules agents follow as a proxy for
h and l . This is an important and useful simplification, for it allows to obtain the
evolution of the trade. In fact, the literature has not studied yet the dynamics of Duffie
et al. (2005). Imagine then that h and l are known. Then it is possible to follow
the distribution of assets across the population of investors. Let μi,j be a measure of
the investors carrying i = {0, 1} assets in state j = {l, h}. The number of investors
is normalized to one, and a fraction s of them carries one asset at each point in time.
Hence μ1,l +μ1,h = s and μ0,l +μ0,h +μ1,l +μ1,h = 1. The Poisson rates that gov-
ern meetings between investors, and between investors and market makers, are αI ,
and αM , respectively. Then, in the steady state, the dynamic programming equation
for an investor that holds one unit of the assets and is in state j = l is
ρV1,l = rl + αIμ0,hθ1SI + αMτB(pB − l) + ω1(V1,h − V1,l),
where ρ is the discount rate. This arbitrage condition says that the flow of payoff for
an I holding one asset in a low state is the flow of utility generated by the asset rl , plus
the expected share of surplus in case of a successful match with another investor or
with a market-maker. The choice trading variable τB is equal to one if (pB −l) > 0
and is equal to zero otherwise. The last term simply accounts for the windfall gain
due to a change of the state from j = l to j = h. Three similar dynamic equations
can be obtained for investors holding an asset when j = 0 and for I not holding any
asset in state j = l or j = h.
This solution is quite general for these types of problems. For instance, if αM = 0
all trade is decentralized we are in the environment similar to Kiyotaki and Wright
(1989). This case applies, for instance, to markets for specialized derivatives. Con-
versely, if αI = 0, the dynamical system is much simpler because it does not depend
on μi,j . This fits well to trading in markets such as NASDAQ. In this special case,
Duffie et al. (2005) show that the spreads are decreasing in αM and increasing in θM
(see their Theorem 2). Jacob Leal et al. (2016) can be considered a case of αI = 0,
but with an important difference: market-makers have unequal access to the inter-
dealer market depending on wether the dealers are closer or further away from the
core of the trading platform.
4 Market discipline
During the 2008 crisis, a major decline in the value of collateral assets, especially real
estate, led to a deterioration of the credit relationships between firms and, arguably,
caused a drop in total credit and investment. Gaffeo and Massimo (2016) argue that
consolidation activities are useful to improve the resilience of the financial system
to shocks and that therefore must be included in the list government tolls for pru-
dential regulation. Complementary work inspired by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) has
looked at the link between credit crunch and innovation. When entrepreneurs can-
not fully commit to repay their lenders, the availability of collateralizable assets
eases their access to credit (Kiyotaki and Moore 1997). But credit relationships can
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tionships with entrepreneurs can better monitor their assets and, hence, recover more
value from asset repossession (Diamond and Rajan 2001). An implication of these
two arguments is that shocks that depress the value of collateral assets or weaken
the credit relationships have the effect of dampening total investment as firms have
more limited access to external finance (Kiyotaki and Moore 1997; Holmstrom and
Tirole 1996).
Gaffeo and Massimo (2016) study the implications of a shock that hits a node of
the interbanking network system under alternative regulations on mergers and acqui-
sitions (M&A). The objective is to understand whether the phenomenon of contagion
is sensitive to M&A licensing policies. In particular, they focus on three types of
activities: (i) vertical merger, which assumes that there is only one large bank in the
system that can acquire other banks; (ii) horizontal merger, whereby the shares of
the target bank are evenly distributed to a number of banks entering in the transac-
tion; (iii) semi-horizontal merger, which allows only two small banks to be part of a
transaction.
Their work builds on two large strands of the literature. One has investigated
how contagion depends on the interaction at the micro level. Gaffeo and Massimo
(2016) propose a contagion mechanism based on an Erdos Re´nyi network model.
We review other approaches that have been used in the literature to describe the
propagation of micro shocks. The second theme is the reasons behind mergers and
acquisitions. Gaffeo and Massimo (2016) motivate their study with the observation
that both in Europe and in the US, the banking sector is now highly concentrated,
partly the result of a series of mergers and acquisitions. Understanding the reasons
behind the M&A can help rationalize the configuration of a network. Indeed, we will
claim that the network should be extended to include also the relationship “within”
companies. In particular, we will present the view that sees M&A as a market con-
trol mechanism that competes with monitoring mechanisms with the firm. In this we
refer to the literature spurred by Manne (1965), who identified three ways in which
the market for corporate control can solve managerial abuses or inefficiencies: proxy
fights, friendly mergers, and hostile takeovers.
4.1 Micro shocks and crisis
Understanding how the type of banking connectivity affect contagion is a challenging
topic, for the results are often difficult to anticipate by looking at the structure of the
network. For instance, Allen and Gale (2000) showed that ring networks, although
they are naturally very sparse, are more prone to systematic failure than a complete
financial network.
In pioneering work on the subject, Jovanovic (1987) and Durlauf (1993) showed
how strong complementarities across firms translate firm level shocks into aggre-
gate fluctuations. These works challenged Lucas’ (1977) diversification argument,
according to which we should not be bothered with microeconomic shocks for they
simply average out and therefore have a negligible effect on aggregate output. The
basic idea is that if one of the n sectors of the economy is hit by a shock, the mag-
nitude of such a shock on the aggregate economy is proportional to the factor 1/
√
n.
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As the number of sectors increases, a sector specific shock vanishes at the macroeco-
nomic level. Alternatively, one could interpret n as the number of firms. This logic,
however, does not take into account the specific linkages across different firms or
sectors. Because firms are linked to one another in many different ways (heterogene-
ity in connectivity), some firms are more important than others. The failure of one of
them, due for instance to a micro shock, might endanger the stability of the system.
In a stylized setup, consider an inter-firm credit network. Each firm has a number
of creditors and debtors. If a firm defaults, its creditors’ balance sheets come under
strain, and this in turn might induce their failure. Thus, default is contagious. If the
initially defaulted firm has few small creditors, its troubles can be easily contained
and its failure will have only marginal effects on the economic system. However, if
the originally defaulted firm is large and has multiple creditors, the system dynamics
might be very different, causing the failure of the entire network.
The vulnerability of a network to a micro shock depends on its topology. Consider
two networks: one is “dense”, as its nodes have a high number of connections, and
the other is “sparse” as it has few connections. Fewer connections contribute to the
robustness of the network, because when a node fails it puts strain only on a few other
nodes. However, a dense network can also be resilient. This is because even though
the shock is passed to many nodes, the strength of the shock that hits each of the
neighboring nodes is weaker due to the diversification of the originally failed node.
The work on network stability originates from the seminal contribution of Albert
et al. (2000), who analyzed two types of shocks to a networked system: a random
failure, meaning that any of the nodes can be hit by the shock with equal probability,
and a targeted attack, where the most influential nodes are attacked first. For both
scenarios, Albert et al. (2000) calculated the minimum share of the nodes destruction
that causes the system to fail. These shares allowed them to compare the networks
resistance across different topologies. They found that real-world networks (such as
the scale-free structures commonly documented in financial markets) are resistant
to random shocks, but susceptible to targeted ones. Other types of networks (small-
world structures) turned out to be more susceptible to random shocks.
Albert et al. (2000) inspired a number of researchers to study contagion and sys-
temic risks. For instance, Gaffeo and Massimo (2016) provide an application on
mergers and acquisitions. The approach has been adopted by policy-makers as well
(ECB 2010). Unlike Albert et al. (2000), whose work is highly abstract, follow-up
works (Stiglitz (2010), Gai et al. (2011), Battiston et al. (2012), Acemoglu et al.
(2012), Acemoglu et al. (2015); among others) provided a range of contextualizations
of linkages among economic entities (credit networks, trade networks, ownership
networks, etc.) as well and a number of interpretations of the micro-shock hitting the
system (bank failure, country default, etc.).
4.2 Market for corporate control
As we mentioned at the beginning of this section, there is a literature that goes back at
least to Manne (1965) arguing that an active market for corporate control is essential
to the smooth working of a modern economy. A key premise underlying this work is
that there is a positive correlation between managerial efficiency and the market value
11
of equity shares. Corporate control would be an efficient instrument in the hands of
high quality management teams to gain control of large re- sources in a short time.
Inefficient managers are replaced with more able managers. Furthermore, it creates
discipline on the incumbent managers and solicits more efforts from them. In princi-
ple, it gives also more power to the shareholders to discipline managers who other-
wise might be tempted to take actions to the detriment of the shareholders. Although
there are many ways in which the managers can extract private benefits, two of these
seem to be more frequent (see, e.g., Khanna 2000; Morck et al. 2005; Campbell
and Keys 2002; Choi and Cowing 1999): Empire building benefits, whereby the
manager derives private benefits from investing beyond what shareholders’ value
maximization calls for, and resource diversion, where the manager siphons resources
of the firm. Iacopetta et al. (2014) integrated these governance frictions in a Schum-
peterian model where growth is driven both by the foundation of new firms that offer
new intermediate products and by investments of incumbent firms in the quality of
existing intermediate products. The discipline on management is solved internally
through a package compensation scheme whereby the shareholders try to align the
managers’ interest by offering them a stake of the firm.
Manne (1965) identified three ways in which the market for corporate control can
solve managerial abuses or inefficiencies, as mentioned above: proxy fights, friendly
mergers, and hostile takeovers. A proxy fight occurs when a group of shareholders
tries to persuade the remaining shareholders to act in concert in order to unseat the
existing board of directors. One might think that a proxy fight is inexpensive because
it can be carried out by a shareholder with a relatively small stake in the firm. In
practice, proxy fights are difficult to win because shares are often dispersed among
many shareholders (see Bhattacharya 1997). In a survey study, Prowse (1995) con-
cluded that, in the U.S., around 80 percent of mergers are friendly transactions and
in Germany it is even higher (90 %).
There are a number of strategic reasons for this. The acquiring firm believes that
the transaction will increase profits by favoring cost reduction, or diminishing com-
petition in the market. The two companies the earnings of which are uncorrelated
might partly insulate themselves from an industry shock. One of the two compa-
nies could have a privileged access to capital, or a better managerial team, or other
resources that can be shared by the two companies. But there are also nonstrategic
reasons. One, already discussed, is the empire building motive. The buyer purchases
a target mainly for the sake of managing a larger enterprise, and not to increase the
profitability. It could also be that the management of the target company stands to
receive a large payment as a reward for giving up control. Equilar (2007) reported
that the average CEO of a large U.S. company received about $29 million in cash
and equity following a change of control. Indeed, research shows that the benefits of
the merger tends to go to the target, even in the case of hostile bids (see Goergen and
Renneboog 2004 and Eckbo 2009).
A hostile takeover takes place when there is a conflict between the acquirers and
the target about the terms of the transaction, about the identity of the management, or
more generally about the most efficient policies to be implemented after the merger.
Manne (1965) placed a lot of trust on the capacity of the market to weed out inef-
ficient management through hostile takeovers. The idea is that the acquirers unseat
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the target management by appealing directly to the target company shareholders.
The empirical literature, however, has not produced evidence indicating that hos-
tile takeovers have led to significant changes in the management efficiency. There
is in fact a free- rider argument elaborated by Grossman and Hart (1980) that may
explain why hostile takeovers are not good discipline devices. The observation is
quite intuitive. If an existing shareholder of the target company expect that after the
takeover the value of the company would go up, he will sell his shares at a higher
price—consistent with the new more effective policies that the new management will
implement. But then every shareholder should hold onto the shares, unless the price
is consistent with the post-takeover value. As the acquirers anticipate this strategy of
the target company shareholders, they will not have an incentive to initiate the trans-
action, for all the surplus will go to the target. Of course some other nonstrategic
reasons (empire building, for instance) could still tempt the acquirers to proceed with
the takeover. Prowse (1995) points out that in the U.S. and U.K., hostile takeover
bids are more frequent than in France, Germany and Japan. Why such differences?
Regulatory restriction does not seem to be the explanation. In fact, there are few
explicit restrictions on takeover attempts in France, Japan, or Germany. Allen and
Gale (2004) believe that the explanation for the difference in takeovers between U.S.
and U.K. relative to France, Japan, and Germany has more to do with cross share-
holdings, which are much more diffused in these three countries (especially Japan)
than in U.S. and U.K.
There are also mechanisms within the firm that help reduce corporate moral haz-
ard and managerial inefficiency, as an alternative to mergers and acquisitions. These
internal mechanisms have a strong policy relevance. Many governments have enacted
policies that have protected business group affiliates, allowing them to disclose lim-
ited information to financial markets. The advocates of these policies claim that the
aggressive investment policies of large business group affiliates have fueled rapid
growth of several countries, such as Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Brazil, Chile, and
Japan. Opponents of these types of policies maintain that these have forestalled
competition and inhibited entrepreneurship. Iacopetta et al. (2014) studied the conse-
quences of these policies. In particular, they considered the moral hazard actions of
managers in situations in which they can engage in resource diversion or undertake
empire building actions. They considered how corporate influence both entrepreneur-
ship, that is, the ease with which new firms can enter product markets, and the speed
at which incumbent firms grow. Scholars (see, e.g., Fulghieri and Suominen 2012;
Hyytinen et al. 2002) have in fact documented the profound effects that corporate
governance reforms have had on the market structure of various countries in recent
decades, influencing the ease with which new firms break into markets.
5 The value of innovation
The work of Gray and Grimaud (2016) enters into fascinating issue of setting
a price for innovation. It has been recognized for a long time that the market
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price for innovation is far from one that would generate an efficient outcome. Gray
and Grimaud approach the question from a theory point of view in a monopolistic
competition model. In such an environment, typically the incentive to generate inno-
vation is based on the flow of profits from the innovation. Nevertheless, the overall
value for the society of the innovation can be much larger. The authors develop an
elegant framework to obtain a price associated with the social value of an innovation.
Specifically, they provide three equilibrium solutions: A market solution, labelled
Schumpeterian equilibrium, a socially-optimal solution, and a third one based on
Lindahl pricing the novelty of the paper. The Lindahl equilibrium differs from the
other two because innovation is priced according the user’s shadow value (i.e. the
marginal profitability of a piece of knowledge) and because the innovator is compen-
sated for all knowledge that is embodied in his innovation. In the Lindahl equilibrium,
rival goods are priced at marginal cost, as in the socially-optimal equilibrium. Their
analysis compares the Lindahl equilibrium with the Schumpeterian and the Social
optimum equilibria from the welfare point of view, aiming at identifying and solv-
ing market distortions. A source of the welfare difference across equilibria has to do
with the appropriation of the returns to quality. The production function they use for
the final good sector implies that private returns to quality are lower than the social
returns, because there are positive externalities associated with investments in quality.
As a result, firms’ investments in quality are below what would be socially desirable.
A second source of distortion is fueled by entry externalities. A potential new
entrant does not account in its entry decision for the positive effects of having a larger
number of varieties in the final good production function. As this effect is not priced,
entrance is lower than is socially desirable. But there is also a countervailing mecha-
nism. A potential new entrant does not consider the “business-stealing” effect, that is,
the reduction of the market shares of the incumbent firms caused by its entrance. This
force may lead to excessive entry. In fact, in an Aghion-Howitt type of model, there
is a potentially more important inefficiency related to the entrance of a new firm: the
destructive effect on the incumbent. The new firm, by building on the knowledge of
the incumbent, will be able to obtain profits partly on knowledge developed by earlier
innovators. As a result, the market may generate too much incentive for entry relative
to the social optimum. A related phenomenon was already emphasized by Dasgupta
and Stiglitz (1980). They demonstrated that R&D expenditures can be excessive in
terms of social welfare because competing firms duplicate and rush to get ahead of
one another’s innovation programs as a way to win the innovation race.
The Dasgupta-Stiglitz type of externalities as well as the Aghion-Howitt mecha-
nism of knowledge appropriation of a new comer from an existing firm partly offset
the tendency of a competitive equilibrium of producing too little knowledge invest-
ments because of the knowledge externalities. It is quite challenging to decompose
empirically the value each piece of knowledge that allows a firm to generate profits.
Many attempts have been made in trying to assess the importance of social and
private returns to knowledge. Baumol (2002), for instance, tackled the question from
two points of view. One is historical. Imagine that the rise of productivity since the
Industrial Revolution occurred largely because of the contribution of innovation. In
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the U.S., per capita GDP has increased more than nine times since 1870, imply-
ing that approximately 90 % of current GDP is due to innovation carried out after
1870. In fact, the contribution may be even larger if one considers that technologi-
cal progress was already quite advanced in 1870. On the investment side, we know
that a fraction less than 30 % of the GDP has been devoted to investments, of which
only a fraction of it (15 %) was spent on R&D. If there is free entry in the innovation
business, one would then expect that the benefits of innovation privately appropri-
ated would be no more than 4.5 % of the GDP. Therefore, more than 80 % of the
benefits of technological advances spillover to the rest of the economy. Baumol also
cross-checked this conclusion with available estimates of private and social return to
innovation elaborated by previous work on the subject and concluded that the ratio
between the private and social rate of return is around 1/5. More recently, Iacopetta
et al. (2014) arrived a similar estimate of about 83 % of uncompensated external
benefits.
6 Human capital and technological progress
Since the work of Nelson and Phelps (1966), a sizeable literature has investigated
the links between human capital and technological progress from a variety of per-
spectives. Documenting empirically the contribution of human capital to innovative
activity has been elusive for several reasons. First, there are measurement errors in
assessing the quantity of human capital. Second, there is no accepted methodology
on how to aggregate human capital across individuals (Galli and Legros 2012). At
a more macro level, Arnold (1998), Funke and Strulik (2000), and Lloyd-Ellis and
Roberts (2002), and Iacopetta (2010, 2011) proposed models that merge the view
that the growth of modern economies is based on the accumulation of human capital
(Uzawa 1965; Lucas 1988; Rebelo 1991) with the view that emphasizes R&D invest-
ments (Romer 1990; Grossman and Helpman 1991; Aghion and Howitt 1992). To
simplify the characterization of the dynamics, Funke and Strulik (2000) and Iacopetta
(2011) assumed that both the innovation and the human capital sector depend only
on the stock of human capital. Kosempel (2004) introduced cross-externalities in
the education and innovation sector, but assumed that the saving rate was exoge-
nous and firms allocated a fixed fraction of output to research and development. In
Iacopetta (2011), as much as in Kosempel, innovation and education mutually rein-
force one another, and the innovation and saving choices are endogenous, although
the dynamical system becomes more complex and it can be solved only numerically.
In Sanditov and Saurabh (2016), human capital is embodied in the inter-personal
relationships among the participants. The study identifies individuals who bridge dis-
tant social spaces as the main promoters of contributions toward public good produc-
tion. Consequently, small-world-like network structures nurture high average contri-
bution toward a public good. Next, we turn to the concept of absorptive capacity,
an important ingredient Sanditov and Saurabh (2016) analysis. Then we will discuss
cumulativeness of knowledge, path dependence and sequential innovation to intro-
duce the main issues studied in Babutsidze (2016) and Marengo and Zeppini (2016).
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6.1 Absorptive capacity and cumulativeness of knowledge
Nelson (1959) observed that new knowledge is a public good as it can be exploited
by individuals who have not contributed to its production. A problem associated
with this aspect of knowledge production is that firms may under invest in R&D
relative to the social optimum. Other inefficiencies in knowledge development have
been conjectured by scholars who emphasize the role of the knowledge complexity
(Pavitt 1987; Malerba and Orsenigo 2000). They observed that the knowledge placed
in public domain is not equally useful to different firms and that this may explain
the difference in technological progress across industries. They also observe that the
skill set in firm’s possession determines the usefulness of public knowledge for this
particular firm. The idiosyncrasy of the skills has been documented, for example, by
Milgrom and Roberts (1990).
More generally, people refer to the concept of absorptive capacity to explain the
heterogeneity of investment rates across firms. The concept of absorptive capacity
has been formally presented in the pioneering work by Cohen and Levinthal (1989).
The authors presented a simple model where the firm’s private R&D efforts increase
not only its knowledge, but also its capacity to absorb the external (i.e. public) knowl-
edge. Public knowledge is created through the spillovers from private R&D activities.
As a result, firms have a dual incentive to invest in R&D. First, because generated
new knowledge directly increases firm’s earnings, and second, because increased
absorptive capacity augments the usefulness of the publicly available knowledge. In
Sanditov and Saurabh (2016), the appropriation of the publicly available knowledge
depends on the inter-personal network across participants. Hence, different network
structures are varyingly successful in encouraging individual. contributions to the
public good (i.e. knowledge).
Others have argued that it is not only the skill sets that can be idiosyncratic across
firms, but also the knowledge itself (Dosi 1997; Cowan et al. 2000). This is the view
that considers the existence of the secrecy and strict patent laws. According to this
stream of research, innovation need not contribute to the enhancement of the public
knowledge. However, it can contribute to increasing not only the knowledge base
of the innovator, but its ability to innovate further (akin to the literature on positive
feedbacks discussed later).
The cumulativeness of knowledge as the determinant of the firm’s success has
been put forward by Malerba (2002). In this setup, certain innovations are highly
cumulative in that their marginal contribution to firm’s knowledge stock is high,
whi‘le some other innovations’ marginal contribution is negligible. Therefore, envi-
ronments with highly cumulative knowledge nurture fewer and larger firms compared
to their non-cumulative knowledge counterparts. The innovation model presented
in Babutsidze (2016) abstracts from the public good part of the general knowledge
and concentrates instead on its cumulativeness at the firm level. Findings therein
highlight that the relationship between knowledge cumulativeness and innovation
patterns is non-monotonic, as previously believed (Breschi et al. 2000). The work
highlights the notion that the highly-cumulative knowledge environment encourages
innovation due to fast expansion of the knowledge base of the innovators. However,
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the not-cumulative knowledge environment encourages further innovation, due to the
size advantage the innovator obtains.
6.2 Path dependence and sequential innovation
The cumulativeness of the knowledge at an aggregate level has profound implications
for the development path of the industry. Cumulativeness implies positive feedback
loops from profits back to innovative practices. One implication of this phenomenon
is path dependence. Starting from the seminal work of Arthur (1989), positive feed-
back loops have been at the core of the technology choice models. Higher R&D
expenditures increase the chance of successful innovation and, therefore, increase
the profit of the firm. Higher profits allow firms to invest even more in R&D,
which further increases firm’s profits. The positive feedback from firm’s profits to
R&D expenditure essentially represents the increasing return to innovation that gives
advantage to already successful firms. Arthur (1989) described how the dynamics of
such systems can be determined by “random” events at the inception of the industry.
When presented the choice between two technological products with consumption
network effects, early consumers’ choices affect greatly the choices of subsequent
consumers. The firm that is successful at the early stages of industry development
obtains a substantial advantage over competitors. In Babutsidze’s contribution, strong
cumulativeness of knowledge almost guarantees to early innovators the success at the
equilibrium state.
An alternative and perhaps equally popular way to model path dependence in eco-
nomics has been by using Polya urns. In these models, colored balls are drawn from
an urn. After every draw, an additional ball of the drawn color (together with the one
drawn) is returned to the urn. This is the mechanism to generate increasing returns.
In order to allow for innovation in this simple choice model, Hoppe (1984) suggested
a way to add a new ball of previously non-existing color (innovation) to the urn.
Although such systems still exhibit path dependence and strong influence of sequen-
tially, they also allow for study of innovation. Marengo and Zeppini (2016) belong
to this modeling tradition. They extend Hoppe-Polya model by adding increasing
returns to innovation—innovation increases the likelihood of further innovation in
subsequent periods.
Path dependence in innovation process has implications for optimal patent pro-
tection and de- sign. Indeed, the cumulative process of knowledge almost inevitably
creates situations in which some innovative feature of a new product builds on exist-
ing patented knowledge. Therefore, there is an issue of accounting for the relative
contribution of two sequential innovators into the latest commercial product. Gray
and Grimaud (2016), as was mentioned in Section 5, analyze how the value of a
patent is split between sequential innovators. Another recent work on the subject is
Chu et al. (2012). They looked at effects the distribution of surplus between two
sequential innovators have on horizontal and vertical innovation. They modified the
Grossman and Helpman (1991) model in two ways. First, the horizontal dimension
is not fixed but can grow over time. Second, in order to consider the division of profit
between sequential innovators along the quality dimension, they assumed, along the
lines of O’Donoghue and Zweiml¸ler (2004), that the most recent innovator infringes
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the patent of the previous innovator. The main question is: How does the splitting
rule of profits between innovators affect the growth rate of the economy and welfare?
Because there are two dimensions of innovations, the answer is quite articulated. The
share of profits transferred by the new entrant (latest innovator) to the incumbent (the
previous innovator) depends on the existing patent legislation and the severity of the
judicial system to punish patent infringements.
A policy reform that strengthens existing patent holder protection tends to dis-
courage a new entrant on the vertical innovation race. But it makes relatively more
attractive horizontal innovation. Here a new entrant always captures 100 % of the
profits until the innovation is challenged by a newcomer, and in such a case the level
of protection would be stronger after the policy reform. Therefore, the overall effect
is ambiguous both in terms of growth and welfare. In a calibration exercise, they
found that strengthening the property rights tend to reduce the growth rate of the
economy because the stifling effect on vertical innovation dominates the propulsive
effect on horizontal innovation. Nevertheless, this result does not imply that welfare
is necessarily worsened because having access to a larger variety of products may
compensate for the lower pace at which existing products improve.
7 Industrial transformation and patterns of consumption
Lorentz et al. (2016) study how changes in the patterns of consumption drive struc-
tural change in production and labor productivity. It links two large strands of
literature. One studies the role of non-homothetic preferences in generating trans-
formation in the composition of production. The other investigates the process of
technological change that occurs with the dissemination of new technologies. For
the first strand of the literature, Bertola et al. (2006) provided a comprehensive and
analytical overview. As for the second stream of literature, Herrendorf et al. (2015)
linked economic growth and transformations, but did not discuss the Schumpeterian
point of view. We will fill this gap by describing the transformation of an econ-
omy the growth of which initially is driven only by market expansion (Smithian
Growth) into a Schumpeterian economy where both quality improvements and prod-
uct variety are present. We then connect the two strands of literature by discussing
Matsuyama (2002) that, in the same spirit of Lorentz et al. (2016), proposed a story
in which the arrival of new industries is triggered by transformation in the patterns of
consumption.
7.1 Market size and innovation
Technological progress has been represented as variety expansion (Romer 1990),
quality improvements (Aghion and Howitt 1992), or a combination of both
(Grossman and Helpman 1991). These works and their extensions, however, have
been applied to study environments where the qualitative characteristics of produc-
tion do not change. A recent flow of work in the Schumpeterian tradition has taken
interest in explaining structural changes. It has been theorized that some aspects of
the innovation process emerge as the economy moves along its development path and
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that the expansion of the market is the initial force that propels the economy towards
more advanced forms of innovation. Economic historians have argued for a long time
that the nature of knowledge creation and the structure of production do change over
time. Baumol (2002) observed that a large share of innovation is performed in a “rou-
tinized” form within existing firms. But Mokyr (2010) noticed that sustained and
continuous innovation resulting from systematic R&D carried out by professional
experts was not at all common until the Industrial Revolution. To give more insights
on the progressive transformation of the economy along the development path, we
follow closely Peretto (2015) who traced the transformation of a Smithian economy
into a Schumpeterian one.
The main premise is that the two engines of growth - horizontal and vertical inno-
vation - respond to distinct characteristics of the historical evolution of the economy.
Peretto’s interpretation of the Schumpeterian approach is that it is not market size
per se that matters but its contribution to the size of the firm. Conversely, given
the size of the average firm, the expansion of the market favors the entrance of
new firms as the rents of incumbent firms become more important. This is more in
line with Smith’s account of development. The economy may stay for a long time
in a pre-innovation state. The only noticeable dynamic force in this early stage of
development is population expansion that induces greater demand of goods.
As the economy evolves, two additional forces contribute to growth. One is the
expansion of the quality of intermediate goods. An intermediate firm will invest in
quality up to the point in which its private return is equal to the market interest rate
return on assets. (If the expected profits are not large enough relative to the existing
interest rate, no investments are devoted to quality improvement.) A second action
comes from the decision to enter the market. Imagine that the firm’s cost of entry is
proportional to its scale of production. If the cost of entry is too high relative to the
expected flow of profits generated by the firm, no new firm is created. But the value
of the firm is increasing in the volume of demand.
This is crucial mechanism in this class of models that trigger the onset of horizon-
tal innovation. Consider an economy that starts out in a situation where there is no
entry and firms earn rents. As population becomes large enough, the rents of incum-
bent firms become large enough to justify the entry cost of new firms. When this
happens, the savings rate starts to go up and the growth rate of final output exhibits a
moderate positive trend. Notice that the entrance of new firms dissipates part of the
rents that incumbent firms would have otherwise obtained. Nevertheless, the pressure
coming from the expansion of the population is enough to maintain an upward trend
on the size of the firm. It should be kept in mind that in this model what matters for
innovation (in quality) is the size of the firm, not that of the market. If this expands
at a slower pace than the rate of entry of new firms, the size of the firm becomes
smaller. When the firm’s size reaches a minimum threshold, so that the profit rate is
comparable to the rate of return to assets, the economy enters the third and last stage
of development.
As is typical of the Schumpeterian tradition, the action that comes from the
demand side is rather limited. In this case, it comes from population expansion. If an
economy with a larger population creates a larger market for an industry, it is more
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likely that incumbent firms invest more. But the entrance of new firms depends cru-
cially on the entry cost, which is taken to be proportional to the size of the firm. Next
we bring the demand side more to the center stage of the analysis, and see how the
qualitative transformation of the economy is related to the structure of preferences.
7.2 Inequality, learning by doing, and industry structure
We turn now to the crucial question raised by Lorentz et al. (2016) of how the features
of the demand affect the structural changes in the industry. We complement their
work by following the approach suggested by Matsuyama (2002), who depicted the
process of development as a Flying Geese pattern: A series of industries takes off
one after another fueled by a rising level of income. The phenomenon of Matsuyama
is well-known since the work of Katona (1964). In the past, even rich societies were
highly segmented when it comes to patterns of consumption. The great majority of
the population struggled for mere existence. Today, in a large number of countries, the
majority of the population enjoys goods that were once considered luxuries (travel,
recreation, durable goods). What is interesting in Matsuyama’s work is that the timing
at which the take-off happens and the variety of products that eventually will be
produced depends on inequality. The basic mechanism of the model is the following.
Households are identical except for their initial income. They have identical, non-
homothetic preferences of a range of consumer goods. As their income increases,
they can afford to buy a larger range of consumer goods. This is quite different than
any of the Schumpeterian models presented in this article, where income is always
equally spread across the existing range of goods.
If in a Schumpeterian model as in Peretto (2015) what is important for the entry
decision is the firm’s size in relation to the cost of entry, in Matsuyama (2002) it is
the number of households that can afford a new good that matters. The arrival of a
new good depends crucially on dynamic learning in existing industries. As the price
of existing goods goes down with the volume of production, a mechanism similar to
the one used by Arrow (1962), more and more real income is freed up for new prod-
ucts. The learning is specific to the industry and there is no inter-industry spillover
of learning-by-doing. A key feature of the model is the trickle- down effect. When
high-income households buy luxury goods it helps in reducing its price and there-
fore makes it affordable to the low-income households. But there is also a trickle-up
effect. When the price of a luxury good is low enough to attract low-income con-
sumer, the expansion of production fuels a further decline of the price which frees
up additional resources of the high-income households that can be used to purchase
a new luxury good. This second mechanism is usually called trickle-up effect. The
productivity gains in one industry sets in a new industry.
For the trickle-up and trickle-down effects to be alive, some income inequality
is needed. If there is too much equality, the economy will trapped into poverty. In
a perfectly equal society, there is no minimum critical mass of individuals that can
set in the trickle-down effect. On the other hand, with too much inequality, nei-
ther the trickle-down nor the trickle-up effect would set in. It is useful to look these
mechanisms in a more formal way.
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Households have hierarchical preferences over J + 1 goods. Let I be the endow-
ment in terms of labor, pi the price good j ≤ J . In the utility function there is also
leisure, which in fact is a residual consumption good: its utility is low enough com-
pared to any other good so that it is consumed only if the residual budget is too small
to buy an additional good j . Imagine that I > p0 so that c = 1. Then a household
with an endowment I will enjoy a utility U = 1 + k + ηl with l = I − Pk ≥ 0,
and where Pk = ∑kj=1pj . The term Pk can be interpreted as the minimum level
of income that induces consumption of good k. Clearly, the demand curve moves in
steps. An additional household’s income induces demand for a manufacturing good
only when it pushes the household’s income above a threshold. From the individ-
ual demand curve it is easy to obtain the aggregate demand for good j . Let F be
the distribution of income across households. Specifically, F(I) is the fraction of the
households whose income is less than or equal to I . All units are in terms of labor.
Hence, differences in income across individuals are due to differences in skills. The
total labor supply is L = ∫ IdF (I). Assuming that there is a continuum of house-
holds in the unit interval, the aggregate demand for good j is simply Cj = 1−F(Pj ).
Two aspects of this demand function are obvious to grasp: (i) the upper bound of the
demand for good j is 1; (ii) the size of the demand depends on income distribution.
The smaller the share of the population that has a level of income of at least Pj the
more modest the demand for good j .
A third aspect is a dynamic one. If a small share of the population can reach a
level of income Pj industry j moves slowly on the learning curve. In particular,
Matsuyama assumed that the amount of labor needed to produce one unit of good
j goes down with the accumulated experience Qj(t). This goes up with the cur-
rent level of production Cj but also there is some losses of past knowledge, that is
Q˙j (t) = δj [Cj (t) − Qj(t)]. As noted above, there is no cross-industry learning.
Nevertheless, it is clear that, if the most sophisticated good is good k, fast learning
in any industry j ≤ k will facilitate the arrival of good k + 1 as well as the its rapid
expansion. But the reverse is not true. Learning in the newest industry does not affect
the demand for older vintages.
This property is in sharp contrast with most Schumpeterian models. As was noted
in Section 6.1, horizontal expansion is associated with a business-stealing effect. A
new firm that enters the market takes some of the demand from firms operating in
other industries. In an Aghion and Howitt environment, the stealing is even greater for
the incumbent firm in the same industry. In the literature with sequential innovators
reviewed in Section 5.2, the stealing is moderated through patent sharing agreements.
In Matsuyama, the independence of the demand of older vintages from the learning-
by-doing in the most recent industry, is a crucial property in order to characterize
the system as a recursive dynamical system. A somewhat inconvenient aspect of the
model is the presence of multiple equilibria. Even worse, when multiple equilibria
are present, the stable fixed-point is inferior from a welfare perspective than any of
the other unstable fixed-points. In other words, in any of the other steady states a
larger fraction of households would enjoy a larger number of consumer goods than
in the one where the economy converges.
In brief, while an environment where the pace of arrival of new industries depend
on the structure of preferences is more appealing, it also poses challenges. The main
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difficulty is to characterize the dynamics. A way out is to use the approach of agent-
based models. Nevertheless, it is important to be alert to what Matsuyama clearly
demonstrates: it is easy to have multiple equilibria.
8 Conclusion
In this final section we offer a few thoughts on further points that could be devel-
oped, building on the works reviewed in this paper. In discussing the links between
finance, growth, and inequality, we discovered an important shift, before and after the
2008 crisis, in the type of questions explored in the literature. Before the crisis, the
emphasis was on the mechanisms through which an unequal distribution of income
or wealth can depress the aggregate level of production. The financial sector could
exacerbate the negative effects of inequality on growth because individuals do not
have equal access to it. Therefore, the poor, who are the most financially constrained,
may not enjoy any benefits from an improvement in the working of the financial mar-
kets. The post-2008 literature, however, has brought a new element: the economy’s
reaction to inequality depends on shocks that occur in the financial market, and, in
fact, some of the inequality itself could be the direct effect of the poor functioning
of the financial system. A mechanism that was reviewed is the following: the rise of
income inequality causes a progressive upward movement of the debt-to-asset ratio
of the middle and lower income group. If this goes up unchecked, a crisis can fol-
low causing a contraction in the real economy. A gap we have noticed the pre and
post-crisis literature is that the models are built from different point of view. Before
the crisis, the starting point tended to be long-run growth models, usually with some
simple endogenous growth (for instance, learning by doing), while in the post-crisis
literature, the issues are framed in short-run macro models. In future research we may
learn more of the short and long run effect of a credit crunch by integrating big finan-
cial shocks into model economies where growth is driven by innovation. In such a
context, one could ask, for instance, if the propagation mechanism of a shock is dif-
ferent depending of the source of innovation, or on the structure of the markets for
new goods, and so on.
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